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Abstract: This study’s case narrative presents the Australian digital marketing firm (DUK). DUK
successfully transitioned across the 2020 Australian business economic downturn created during
the COVID-19 global pandemic. DUK’s competencies, capabilities and competitiveness form its
3Cs Market Intelligence Framework. When these 3Cs are expanded, and then networked with
Porter’s Five Forces model, along with the firm’s decisive pivot with knowledge inclusions, the DUK
strategic change matrix can be used to portray a firm’s matrix-box of its current multi-dimensional
business components. The strategic change matrix approach offers a firm a visual map that can be
matrix-boxed and quickly interpreted. When faced with adversity, a firm can remap its matrix-box
into an expanded form that includes its proposed enhanced competitiveness business solutions.
These solutions can then be operationalised to form potentially sustainable business pathways into
the future. This approach is particularly useful when a firm is confronted with a perceived economic,
or game-changing business crisis, or when a firm makes the strategic decision to pivot, and to seek
a new sustainable business-enhancing pathway, or when a firm just wants to visualise its ongoing
business pathways into the future.
Keywords: sustainable business; competitive advantage; competency; innovation; knowledge
creation; intellectual capital; capability; business system; digital marketing; Porter’s Five Forces
1. Introduction
This study asks, across the global COVID-19 pandemic in Australia, how can a sizeable business
like the digital marketing firm DUK, re-adjust its business when its traditional client markets change,
and then emerge in a sustainable competitive business position?
On 31 December 2019, China reported a novel coronavirus to the World Health Organisation.
On 11 February 2020, this disease was named COVID-19. By 26 February 2020, COVID-19 had been
detected on all continents, except for Antarctica [1].
On 21 March 2020, the emerging global COVID-19 health crisis led the Australian Government to
close its borders. On returning to Australia from overseas, inbound citizens then moved through a
14-day testing and isolation period before re-integrating back into the Australian community. During
February–June 2020, Australian citizens and all non-permanent residents were instructed to socially
distance. Those who were not working in essential industries were instructed to stay at home, and to
avoid attending mass-gathering locations—such as sports venues, theatres, gyms, shopping centres,
and restaurants [2]. Interstate travel was restricted and most State and Territory borders were closed.
This restrictive Australian Government COVID-19 response, in effect, closed down the Nation’s
social venues, closed contact events, stopped sports activities, and moved much of the business
workforce into working from home environments. It then forced around 10% of the Nation’s workforce
into unemployment, and placed nearly 40% of the workforce into a government supported ‘JobKeeper’
restrictive work role. This process extended into much of the business sector resulting in around one
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million businesses effectively being placed into a hibernation state that is expected to last for up to six
months [2]. This has created considerable economic damage to the Australian business sector, and it
has delivered a shock-wave effect across the Australian economy.
Globally, lockdown days, monetary policy decisions and international travel restrictions have
severely lowered both economic activities and major stock market indices. In contrast, the imposed
international travel restrictions and higher fiscal policy spending had positively impacted economic
activities, although the increasing number of confirmed coronavirus cases did not have a significant
effect on the level of economic activities [3].
The Australian Government directed business hibernation, and restricted human movement
beyond the home, along with contact restrictions with any persons beyond the household, all of which
have slowed sales, affected profits, slowed services, almost stopped marketing, slowed manufacturing,
stopped tourism, stopped shopping centre retailing, and minimised non-essential business operations.
This Australian Government COVID-19 response has also stopped many services and businesses from
operating. These decisions in total have left over 15% of the workforce unemployed, and with little new
work opportunities available, some people are now reporting ancillary health and mental issues [2].
The Australian COVID-19 economic impact is likely to surpass 15% of GDP, with government
expenditure exceeding $300 billion to offset losses to the workforce, consumption, and investment [4].
Into the future, and after COVID-19, Australia as a nation is likely to pursue the rebuilding of its
economy, and this may also encompass significant changes in societal perspectives [5]. Against the
ongoing COVID-19 background, how does a business survive in Australia when its traditional client
markets change, and post COVID-19, how does it then emerge as a sustainable competitive business?
1.1. Strategic and Theoretical Underpinning of a Firm’s Sustainable Competitive Business
Theory delivering a sustainable competitive business remains inconsistent. In part, this is
because a firm’s business can encompass a diversity of activities. A firm typically adopts a strategic
management process. This likely encompasses a ‘resource-based view’ of the firm, plus theoretical
extensions encompassing business expert systems, knowledge development/utilisation capabilities,
and delivering sustainable (competitive) business advantage [6]. This theoretical resource-based view
also captures strategies [7], competencies [8], business innovation [9], economic worth [10], product
development [11], and research implications [12].
However, several other strategic management approaches may exist beyond the resource-based
(internal) view and its superior heterogeneous firm returns [13–15]. For example the ‘industry-structure’
(external) view focuses on superior returns [14,16,17], the ‘competence-based’ view efficiently uses
resources [18], the ‘knowledge-based’ view engages knowledge as a key productive resource [19], and
the ‘relational’ view encompasses and extends the above alternate approaches— by enlisting cooperative
strategy placements, by interlinking bi-directional networks, and by building of intra-organisational
and inter-organisational competitive advantage [20]. The ‘relational’ view of the firm also adds
dynamic data to the business and its external environments [21], and it is most applicable to the firm’s
strategic management domain.
The build of a sustainable competitive business also fits within institutional theory as talent-resourced
firms enlist their workforces to target the competitive advantage that can arise between the firm and its
upstream and downstream partners [22].
Thus, a firm combines its competencies and its intellectual data analytics into a relational system
designed to deliver its capabilities, resources and its deliverables, whilst producing an ongoing
competitive advantage position [23,24]. When competitive advantage is associated with an improved
economic performance [25], the firm can achieve further competitiveness. Transaction cost economics
theory [26], social capital theory, and organisational learning theory can also help the firm build
strategic business solutions within its surrounding competitive environment [26].
However, a firm’s strategic management even extends into behavioural theory. Here, the theory
of planned behaviour [27], motivation theories [28], consumption theory [29], and users-gratification
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theory [30], can also help it build consumer-targeted solutions that ultimately contribute to its
competitiveness. Such behavioural theories support the position and time-lined relational sequential
flow of Figure 1’s 3Cs Framework blocks.
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Figure 1’s 3Cs embody a resource transference relationship. This occurs relationally, sequentially,
and over time. Hence it is causal—from competencies to capabilities, to competitiveness. As a causal
structure, it can enlist construct items—measured against a Likert scale framework. The model’s causal
flows both within (and between) the constructs (and their item measures), and the relationally-mapped
causality can be mapped against Hume’s theory of causation and Aristotle’s 4-step theory of
causation [31] (material-cause—construct literature-defined and with relevant literature-supported
measurement items; then formal-cause—measurement items construct-linked, and typologically
grouped; then efficient-cause—data capturing ‘best’ representation of each construct; and then
final-cause—constructs jointly modelled as a statistically relevant business solution).
Thus, the firm strategically and collectively encompasses a broad spectrum of theories. However,
it does fit within the strategic management relational view of the firm, and consequently fits within the
strategic management paradigm. The above section also sets the theoretical framework for the building
of a strategic 3Cs Market Intelligence Framework (Figure 2)—one that is likely adept at delivering
dynamic, inter-firm competitive advantage [20,21,32].
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long-term, and solid firm revenue stream—that easily supported over 30 high-skilled, lead marketers,
almost vanished—with around 70% of DUK’s revenue steam disappearing across two months.
Like other marketers, DUK first used its competencies and leveraged these to apply its client’s
capabilities towards generating additional physical and digital consumer reach, and subsequent sales
improvements [33]. However, DUK, unlike its competitors, operated differently when dealing with its
clients. Its workforce acted as both physical and digital marketing strategists [33,34], and as ongoing
management consultants [35].
DUK’s client marketing involved bringing its unique, research-developed 3Cs business model
approach (Figure 1) into the contracting client’s domain. This offered a differentiated digital
marketing approach—aimed beyond marketing, and towards also enhancing the contracting client’s
competitiveness outcomes [33,36,37]. This complex DUK marketing approach remains difficult to
imitate or transfer. It strategically structures DUK into its ongoing lead marketing position. It allows
DUK to follow multiple system pathways across its P1 and P2 transitions, and to closely understand its
contracting client’s business. With such understanding comes the relational trust, and ability to share
additional business deliverables into, or within, the client’s capabilities set. This is well beyond, but
complimentary to, its normal market reach and product sales solution. This DUK–client relationship
also offers a pathway towards an invigorated client competitiveness business positioning [38].
2. DUK 3Cs Internal Strategic Marketing Approach
COVID-19 created massive revenue decline to DUK’s digital marketing and forced it to investigate
all business survival options. The DUK team scoured all marketing and sales opportunities, and
assessed these against its clever research and development. DUK shifted its external 3Cs strategic
marketing approach with its contracted clients, and turned this approach inwards as a 3Cs strategic
marketing and management consulting approach—but with DUK as its own client. It then quickly
pivoted to totally new markets.
2.1. DUK’s Competencies
DUK first considered its existing competencies. Its business capacities were used to drive a clear
client, firm value for money, product-focusing, high-quality product development, rapid business
change, and authentic, enduring business leadership [39]. These competencies flowed through its
advanced programming, data storage, digital integration, design, research and development, content
creation, social connectivities, social collaboration, animation, video, and incentiviser pathways. DUK’s
ability to adapt and build creative marketing and sales strategies alongside strategic management
and finance leadership have helped to make DUK one of the market leaders in the digital domain.
Therefore, DUK’s in-depth talents lay within the digital domain.
DUK’s knowledge creation delivered (1) past (and stored) learned experiences, (2) knowledge-based
digital infrastructures and customer practices for the client, (3) expert knowledge development, and
(4) new knowledge collations for the client. DUK collated its expert knowledge developments, and its
new knowledge into achieving strategic corporate and marketing results for their clients. Thus, the DUK
Agency actually operated as a strategic management and marketing consultancy firm [40]. Its ongoing
knowledge creation and its supporting innovation pursuits also helped it to tap into its internal abilities to
find and to build new expertise.
DUK’s digital innovation chased unique benefits, framed agility into its problem solving, chased
tomorrow’s future emergent hypes, redesigned work and continually solved requests, and transformed
its digital capabilities into an exponential growth driver [41,42]. Thus, DUK knew how to work in
fast-changing environments. Hence, it sought to leverage more from its technologies, and to stay in
demand. DUK then turned its attention to a Gartner Hype Cycle with future emergent positional
ratings of (1) marketing and advertising, (2) emerging technologies, (3) block chain business, and
(4) artificial intelligences [43]. It assessed these possibilities as potential saleable media, and as mobile
marketing media pathways beyond COVID-19.
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DUK held considerable intellectual capital—both across its workforce, and stored—digitally.
This enabled it to (1) build leading market reach consulting pathways, (2) improve and grow digital and
social capital, (3) create world-class performance, and (4) match accessible resources to task completions.
The ambidextrous nature of its intellectual capital provided it with a sustained performance [44]. Thus,
DUK was in a position to reinvent itself, and to pivot with knowledge as required.
Next, a DUK-specific ideas generating brainstorming session was applied. Productive ideas
included: service existing clients superbly with social connectivities and client–client cross-marketing;
offer site(s) updating with creations such as dynamic information walls, and multiple client market
reach enhancers; against less competition, use its SEO competencies to reposition clients into top of
listings; apply extensive consumer tracking data to clients, etc. In-depth DUK debating also concluded
that although client retention was likely, this strategy would likely generate insufficient additional
revenue. However, these solutions were seen as long-term, doable, diversifying, new business and
marketing pathway enablers that would enable growth and increase revenue beyond COVID-19.
2.2. DUK’s Capabilities
With the background research job part completed, DUK next turned to investigating its capabilities.
DUK’s capabilities are applied systems of developed business deliverables aimed towards increased
firm competitiveness. First, using its competencies, a digital shopping centre was pursued as a
pivot with knowledge model capable of meeting the likely needs of current and future Australian
consumers. COVID-19 had forced buying from home and had forced consumers to learn ‘new’ online
shopping skills.
The digital shopping venture offered DUK an additional sustainable business, and if developed
astutely, it offered a long-term competitive diversification pivot for DUK. This complex task was readily
doable. It drew on DUK’s in-house programmers, its combined data systems, its business development
packages, its intellectual capital/IP, and its real-time tracking and logistics systems.
DUK then built its digital shopping venture as a new mobile-targeted business system— specifically
targeting real-time and connecting with the external consumer market. To frame its approach, DUK
enlisted the two left-side adaption and application knowledge blocks of Figure 1’s 3Cs. It created its
necessary capabilities into internal/external networked (1) business values deliverance systems [45],
(2) risks avoidance systems [46,47], and (3) marketing and sales systems [33]. These blocks are expanded
in Figure 2 but they are also specifically focused towards delivering both business sustainability and
competitive intelligence advantages. Feedback loops also operate across the three blocks of DUK’s 3Cs
Market Intelligence Framework as shown in Figure 3.
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2.2.1. Capabilities Investigations
DUK’s new digital shopping venture then saw it explore further business capabilities, and to seek
further business externalities inclusions [48,49]. Hence, DUK embarked upon a global marketplace and
marketspace business opportunities assessment. The workforce scanned for ideas. It looked at (1) its past
marketspace leaders, (2) winners in the digital world, (3) hype cycle inventions/concepts/developments,
(4) innovative products, (5) digital creations, and (6) new challenges. DUK generated a list of feasible
risk assessed, and new initiatives that could be marketed. With this background, attention turned to
COVID-19 and its new health-related growth of new businesses.
DUK tackled the COVID-19 health domain. It brainstormed COVID-19-related areas such as
personal professional equipment (face masks/shields, goggles/glasses, gloves, gowns, head/shoe
covers, full coveralls, etc.). Such contact prevention aids helped protect health workers against the
transmission of the virus via direct contact, or via droplet transmission pathways. These devices
required manufacturing or importing. DUK investigated this option, but it held time, production and
logistic uncertainties, price fluctuations, and foreign currency exposure.
Personal checking devices (temperature detectors, testing sets, etc.), and the operational treatment
requirements (ventilators, oxygen, isolation rooms/beds, etc.) also supported the above contact
prevention areas. These items required local or international sourcing, and, at times, variable delivery
timelines, but symptoms measurement software was possible—with appropriate DUK partnerships.
Drugs and other applicators designed to treat and overcome this virus likely required specialist
trials, and lengthy approvals, as no recognised solution to COVID-19 had yet emerged from existing
drugs/mixes or new formulations. This area was considered beyond DUK’s expertise.
Personal hygiene was another area of prevention (soaps, hand sanitisers, wipes, alcohol, etc.).
Such manufacturing processes are in existence in Australia, so a late entry needed to have a competitive
edge, and a specialist partner. Hence, further market research into this already competitive market
area was deemed essential by DUK.
Waste disposal of the above items and medical treatment items was specialised and beyond DUK’s
skills set, but tracking the waste was likely doable using an existing identification and tracking system.
However, this likely remained as specialist peer-to-peer logistics requirements/systems (specifications,
connectivities, sourcing, shipping, etc.), but these were deemed largely beyond DUK’s domain.
Many other COVID-19-related health, personnel, and aged care home options were also identified,
mapped, trialed, and assessed. For example, a notifications and information wall was established and
sold to aged care homes as a virtual means of ongoing contact between isolated elderly parents and
their family members.
DUK also looked for inspiration. It noted that a world shortage of respirators for severely ill
COVID-19 patients was leading one of the Australian V8 Supercars racing teams to pivot. It tracked this
pivot approach [50]. Here, the Triple Eight’s T8 race team engineers rapidly pivoted from intelligent car
ventilation systems. They set about creating a medical respirator for COVID-19 patients. This involved
the rapid design, creation, prototyping, refining and miniaturising of a unique medical ICU hospital
respirator, but based on the race car’s intelligent ventilation system. This respirator was designed to be
portable, complete with (1) alarms, (2) a 4G telemetry system messaging a central digital dashboard
station, and (3) a simultaneous monitoring capability. This group of patients could now be monitored
in real-time across multiple hospital rooms by one supervisor.
This car racing pivot with knowledge aligned to DUK’s 3Cs business leadership perspectives.
It provided DUK with ongoing inspiration as it reconsidered the extent of its possible capabilities
pivots and future change options.
2.2.2. Capabilities Targeting
DUK identified its target COVID-19 areas as personal professional equipment, personal hygiene,
personal checking, and communications logistics. As health marketing per se was unlikely to offer
sufficient revenue, the company chose to pivot with knowledge, but initially across multiple related
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domains. A team built logistics, tracking and digital wall connectivities software. A team pursued
overseas suppliers. A team supported its few remaining clients with the latest ideas and extras. A team
pivoted in pursuit of the high-profit hand sanitiser market. All teams delivered complimentary DUK
business contributions.
Management chased the pivoting to hand sanitiser manufacture and sales. It approached one of
its Australian distillery clients (termed herein ‘the XYZ Distillery’), and made a Joint Venture pitch.
The XYZ Distillery was already profitable, but it too recognised the unique opportunity of a pivot into
a higher profit sanitiser area. Both DUK and the XYZ Distillery agreed to pivot and share profits.
2.3. DUK–XYZ Distillery: Pivot into a Joint Venture
Within a few days, a Joint Venture formed, but the two companies were operational from business
centres located over 1500 kms apart. Shipments of hand sanitiser from the XYZ Distillery to DUK
involved a 14-hour 660 km road and sea crossing, plus road transport to Sydney. The Joint Venture
then ensured all formulations adhered to WHO standards. This was a necessary legal requirement
before selling any alcohol-based hand sanitiser products.
The XYZ Distillery set about the upstream manufacture of hand sanitiser (a 1–2 week process).
Through research, they rapidly sourced and successfully formulated hand sanitiser products. This was
followed by immediate trials and testing, and both were successful.
Alcohol production and hand sanitiser-blended product manufacture were both ramped up.
Occasional large orders were supplied direct from the XYZ Distillery, but around 90% of the hand
sanitiser product was shipped 1300 kms by sea and by road to Sydney in 1000 litre containers.
DUK, led by its research and development, marketing/sales innovation, and its strategic
management team pursued all sanitiser production downstream business requirements. Its new
transactional website, and new social sites, then pre-sold the Joint Venture’s hand sanitiser product to
an Australia-wide market. The Joint Venture’s DUK digital transactions website and its associated
new Joint Venture social sites logged and prioritised orders. Labels meeting approved TGA and WHO
standards were designed, printed, and fixed to the sanitiser bottles. Express shipping of consumer
orders was coordinated, and digitally tracked. Bulk re-bottling from 1000 litre containers to 500 mL
glass bottles opened another personal consumer market and extended the hand sanitiser’s market reach.
Plastic spray bottle manufacturers in Australia could only supply large quantities in two months’
time, so overseas bottle suppliers were sought. Again, a lengthy four-week international supply time
was required. To minimise time-to-market, the XYZ Distillery also shipped to Sydney 15-litre plastic
drums, and pre-filled 500 mL, design-stamped glass bottles. To further expand the product range and
meet a consumer small product demand, small 250 mL plastic bottles were bulk ordered. All product
materials coalesced into DUK’s new shared Sydney warehousing, bottling, labelling, logistics, and
shipping facility. DUK also pursued temperature devices, masks/shields, and gloves as potential
additional health-related revenue streams.
Next, as supplies ramped up in Sydney, new sales avenues were tackled including: small chain,
but large-sized supermarkets, schools and universities, plus large tier-1 and tier-2 building firms. Here,
the competition remained fierce but DUK’s marketing skills soon found a niche. The Joint Venture
found the market required a differentiated hand sanitiser solution formulation, aimed specifically at
dispensing refill containers across work sites. A second substantive market lay in the industry-wide
need for continual surface cleaning sanitisers. These solutions clean contactable surfaces around places
where people congregate, eat, or work. These included shared spaces such as hot desks, education
work/study benches, lunch rooms, toilets and meeting rooms.
The sanitiser market extended physically into shop (reseller) sales, and into market-style street
stall refills/sales. Digitally, the consumer market is now recognising the Joint Venture’s hand sanitiser
brand, and associating the brand with positive quality feedback and rapid operational deliveries.
Hence, sales moved strongly into a reselling domain, and a new sustainable Joint Venture business
was created for both participating firms.
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2.4. Joint Venture Markets Extension
The Joint Venture story now extends into the hospital grade 80% alcohol-based sanitiser.
This product was again pre-sold to nursing homes, and to elderly residential settlements. This successful
Joint Venture remains important to both DUK and the XYZ Distillery as it provides them both a
secondary business pathway beyond the COVID-19 crisis. From DUK’s perspective, the Joint Venture
helped it reallocate additional work into researching its digital marketing domain, and into further
assisting its remaining digital marketing business clients.
This pivoting seems simple, but many have tried this particular pivot and failed. In effect, and
within a few days, both DUK, and the XYZ Distillery fully pivoted into a new business domain. The XYZ
Distillery added a hand sanitiser production line. DUK transformed a section of its workforce into
this new strategic business operation—encompassing digital sales, production forecasting, shipping,
storage, bottling, packaging and distribution. However, it still maintained a successful, but downsized,
skeleton, client-focused, digital marketing operation.
This successful Joint Venture pivot was not luck. It was mutually formulated and it built on the
mutual relational trust between the two firms. It developed shared inter-firm resources. It followed
a strict, structured, and latest research-modelled logical progression. This approach was aimed at
delivering to both firms an ongoing additional competitiveness positioning.
2.5. The DUK Digital Shopping Markets Extension
COVID-19 restrictions meant much of the Australian population came under Government
instruction to stay isolated around their homes. Today, most Australian homes are either optically,
digitally, or mobile connected. Millions within the Australian workforce now fulfill their job roles
remotely across the digital divide. Millions of others have quickly learned new digital ways to
(1) engage, (2) digitally learn, (3) digitally communicate, (4) digitally shop, and even (5) consult with
doctors via a new digital Telehealth service. Hence, the Australian market has necessarily acquired
better digital skills. DUK saw this as a market ready for a new comprehensive style of virtual shopping,
but at warehouse price points.
DUK pursued this new, dynamic, and large scale business opportunity. It market-targeted
consumers and their requirements. It quickly built contacts, chased discounting warehouses, and
tapped ‘reliable’ overseas suppliers. It then established its new ‘Amazon-style’ digital shop. Here, a
consumer buys through the virtual warehouse shop front, with purchase items supplied directly from
the warehouse, the manufacturer, the importer, or from offshore suppliers. This virtual shopping centre
required DUK’s exemplar marketing, a substantive DUK website with the best of its web-social-mobile
features, secure programming, virtual payment options, and block chain solutions. All were readily
doable. DUK’s virtual warehouse shopping centre has since led it into another pivoted Joint Venture.
It is now operating this new digital warehouse Joint Venture as a very different mobile warehouse
distribution business.
3. Materials and Methods
3.1. Successful Pivoting: The 3Cs Market Execution Approach
DUK’s rapid pivots with knowledge approaches enabled it to confront, and climb, new learning
curves. These approaches were strategised, mapped, and causally executed to deliver a new Joint
Venture with unique capabilities designed to ultimately produce future business competitiveness.
The DUK leadership team had a university professorial consultant on retainer. Following the above
brainstorming, latest ongoing research, and academic input, DUK recognised the need to pivot with
knowledge. The DUK academic approach blended management consulting [40], digital leadership,
strategic business positioning, and competitiveness studies. It followed DUK’s 3Cs Framework as
outlined in Figures 1 and 2. DUK tackled its internal and external business pivot, resetting against a
5-fold ‘what, when, where, why, and how’ solution.
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3.1.1. The ‘What’ Solution
In considering ‘what’, DUK started with its competencies. First, it reassessed its knowledge
creation. DUK advanced its knowledge creation business through benchmarking and astute website
measurements, internal and external intelligences, consumer tracking assessments, plus effective
knowledge capture across governance, human capital and innovation dimensions. These collectively
helped further gauge its physical and virtual directions towards business sustainability and competitive
business advantages [51–53]. Its top programmers, top software and secure storage, top designers,
top social connectors, and top content deliverers were team redirected towards what could possibly
be instantly translated. DUK then aligned with the emerging consumer demand areas created
by COVID-19.
Next, this knowledge creation translation was integrated with DUK’s recognised unique digital
capacities. Additional knowledge creation and capacities links were established. Some were
systems-incorporated as instant multi-channel reach and new market stimulation promoters.
These could then focus towards targeting the broader national digital consumer markets across Australia.
DUK then considered its innovation domain, and how its workforce found new opportunities,
ideas, and applications. Its weekly workforce research time allocation shifted into adaptive innovation,
and daily learn/share sessions arose. Workforce members undertook constant exploratory experiments
to find new motivating initiatives, often aimed at driving intended, and extended, adaptive
market opportunities.
DUK also re-assessed and re-purposed aspects of its intellectual capital, and considered all four
strategic competency domains as its combined adaptive hype cycle system. It recognised that the
possibility of necessary COVID-19 response pivots did bring new market reach and also provided
new sources of consumer demand. The ‘what’ DUK selected incorporated its whole-of-firm strategic
thinking approach, the repurposing of its huge databases, and the tapping of both its IP and its instant
contact capabilities. It then set about developing the rest of its business solution.
3.1.2. The ‘When’ Solution
For a ‘when’ solution, DUK set about designing new digital approaches—new responsive, quick
decision/completion websites, mobile sites (and apps), new social sites (Facebook, Instagram, Tinder,
and other social media sites). It enlisted its advanced Google search engine top positioning strategies.
It incorporated Microsoft’s Democratising IT offerings. It incorporated smart SEO, rapid tracking
and secure multi-correction features, and so developed a new engaging informative, connective,
internally-focused complete marketing package. Thus, whilst working on its Joint Venture sanitiser
business, DUK also constructed, programmed, developed, and made ready a new digital operational
framework. This process integrated many existing components. In reality, DUK had many of the
required components in place, and it was experimenting in this area. Hence its final solution was live
within a few weeks, and it then took only a few months to be fully refined.
3.1.3. The ‘Where’ Solution
The ‘where’ solution draws on DUK’s suite of competencies to help initiate, adapt, and
action its capabilities. The 3Cs Framework model in Figure 1 integrates mixes of knowledge
supporting competencies systems as systems initiators of the new and existing deliverables embedded
across its business capabilities applications block. These actioned deliverables work in complex
systems-within-systems. DUK follows their known embedded pathways when enhancing operational
business values, when lowering business risks, and when yielding new marketing and sales
opportunities. These confidential DUK pathways across the P1 transaction divide are ‘where’ DUK
derives contributions towards its strategic business competitiveness opportunities.
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3.1.4. The ‘Why’ Solution
The ‘why’ successfully extends and grows the right-hand competitiveness contributions area of
Figures 1 and 2. Here, DUK’s three Figure 2 capabilities blocks, and their net P2 pathways connections
to competitiveness is gauged across three separate operating systems. First, the DUK 3Cs business
operations capabilities block draws on its innovation and intellectual capital, and focuses into building
additional quality products. Where DUK’s new or improved quality product performs to a level
likely sufficient to be a revenue generator, it is then performance-assessed and adopted as a future
deliverer of economic worth. Hence, this capabilities block interlinks competencies and capabilities
as a values-enhancing system, and so offers new points of difference of benefit to DUK’s ongoing
business sustainability.
Second, the DUK risk mitigation capabilities block aims at mitigating business risks. Here DUK’s
weighted business risks are assessed. A risks mitigation (or risks avoidance) prioritisation then
guides a competencies (capacities) and capabilities (qualities, risks mitigation and client satisfaction)
connectivities system into the DUK’s business sustainability. Thus, as DUK’s risks are combatted and
lessened, its clients note a low risk, and this contributes towards client satisfaction and helps improve
DUK’s ongoing business sustainability.
Third, the DUK business markets and sales capabilities block sees DUK competencies systems, its
product qualities enhancements, and its market risks mitigations coalesce into its serviced marketing.
This block is where its marketing and sales databases, its digital platforms, and its digital IP (including
market reach extenders) help extend its economically rewarding market reach, whilst delivering
better client servicing. This in turn drives DUK’s competitive advantage, and to some extent, aids its
business sustainability.
3.1.5. The ‘How’ Solution
DUK’s ‘how’ solution considers pivots with knowledge. It assesses how to adapt the business model
and thus generate new initiating competencies. It assesses the build of relevant new capabilities systems
and then adjusts its knowledge-like, hype cycle system deliverables. Its feedback processes then boost
its existing competencies and new knowledge systems. Thus, a stronger business sustainability is
acquired along with further competitive business and market intelligence advantages.
DUK has always been a research-driven firm. It employs its own academic business researcher.
It remains an early adopter and/or initiator of new strategic and market reach processes.
Its workforce participates in a one hour-per-week research time. Here, items of interest and/or new
business possibilities are investigated, discussed, and ranked for further analysis. Over the next week,
high ranking research ideas and/or key business concepts with potential hype cycle jumps are mapped
for development. These potential team-specific, or purposed DUK-wide ideas are then assessed as to
how they can be business translated and practically adopted.
DUK also investigates market trends. For many years, it established and then remotely operated
its own Nepal programming group. It had remote work-tracking, virtual work-time-tracking and
monitored computer/email/chat usage, plus timed job lots, an on-sight management oversight, external
specialist work-task tracking, and at-call video links, helped it maintain a global work ethic.
DUK trialed this remote workforce approach during COVID-19. It ensured its essential top-tier
employees remained in office to maintain its rapid-response brand image. Its remote work-from-home
workforce members also maintained team clock-in/out time blocks. This allowed knowledgeable,
quick-exchange corrections, whilst retaining business agility, business resilience and operational
efficiencies. However, DUK’s net productivity still declined to around 70%. Cross-team dynamic
exchanges and ideas swapping declined, some poor connectivites affected production, other rapid-fire
communications were missed, and occasional deadlines along with programming complications arose.
Hence, after two months, DUK reverted to its dynamic office workplace approach, but in special cases,
it now allows remote work-from-home tasking.
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Next, DUK turned to its marketing functions. Here, under COVID-19 restrictions, DUK’s
considerably reduced clientele, and its revenue streams forced a re-look at data monitoring and
optimisations throughout existing relational client processes. It reframed its ad-click-to-site strategy,
and refocused on direct/organic searching linkages with external frequented sites. It remapped client
keyword performances, and pushed organic search traffic via new optimised website content and
meta-tags, and it chased referral swaps with other popular external digital sites. It trialed new ad
formats and linkage approaches. It enlisted its video group to re-create, and precisely reach target
markets and so produce more economic worth from each client spend.
4. Discussion
4.1. The ‘Pivot with Knowledge’ Solution
Adopting the above changes, and its business pivots with knowledge approach, DUK produced new
business pathways through the COVID-19 economic downturn. All ideas and perceived opportunities
were intelligently sifted, and the best ideas were attempted. The DUK workplace became a busy,
research-active, competitive (in part to prevent possible job losses), creative, and innovative operations
zone. As new research assessments materialised, DUK’s ‘ideas board’ continually changed. The one
hour-per-week research time, transitioned in part to a daily new knowledge assessment of latest
activities refinements. The workforce, as a marketing team, stayed on task, and any idle time was
committed to any task that supported the firm’s ongoing competitiveness.
The programmers, designers, content developers, social connectors, proofers and programmers
developed new products for the existing clients, whilst also building and trialing new pivot solutions.
Team leaders worked with their clients and carefully service-managed them.
Management and finance sought cost savings and cash accounting. They tightly monitored
expenses, such as advertising, marketing, purchases, printing, shipping, software, client-management
systems, web and other digital sites. They minimised client payments-in-arrears, and individually
assisted every existing client to retain sales.
Marketing (and sales) chased COVID-19-driven, new health and health-support businesses, and
considered all DUK ideas/opportunities as potential pivots to new markets, new clients, and new
consumers. This required new tactics, new data-mining, and new knowledge processing.
DUK’s programmers successfully digitally remodelled its business platform to allow further
intelligent tracking and to flag workforce, client and consumer data with requirements versus
deliverables. These also mapped against its 3Cs approach. This provided management with additional
digital dashboard controls and with additional rapid response decision-making capabilities.
Other DUK successful pivots included its digital contact wall creations for existing clients, and
integrated cross-platform video ads for web, social and mobile sites. It also created a new shipping
and marketing business supplying grades of hand sanitiser and surface cleaner Australia-wide.
It established a new, in-house owned and operated digital warehouse shopping centre and another
digital warehouse Joint Venture. Both digital consumer-engaging sites were structured with their own
unique block chain and value chain approaches—complete with social media linkages, product sales
facilities, logistics distribution and Australia-wide network tracing.
4.2. Future-Proofing the Firm
In times of crisis, such as the economic decline created through the COVID-19 global pandemic,
agile, on-task services firms can consider similar approaches adopted by the marketing firm DUK.
These firms first draw on their 3Cs advanced future scenario mappings of their businesses. They then
pursue their chosen researched business changes option. Such firms likely need to maintain a workforce
that can remain agile, flexible, and possess the capacities and capabilities for rapid and directional
business pivot changes.
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A Sydney service industries printing firm employing 30-plus staff, recently pivoted under
COVID-19 business restriction pressures, and created the online business BuildaDesk.com.au. Its desk
is made of a local expandable, environmentally-friendly, plastics-free, honeycomb board. It can be
assembled without tools. It is also shipped Australia-wide in 48 hours, and costs only $149. This pivot
has given this printing firm a new worldwide market. Again, workforce agility, flexibility, and the
ability of staff to brainstorm, innovate, and pivot with knowledge is an essential 3Cs process contributor
towards maintaining business sustainability.
Producers, like the XYZ Distillery, should also remain agile and look for alternative uses of their
production lines. With little adjustment, the XYZ Distillery pivoted one production line, purchased a
few minor ingredients and made hand sanitiser solutions and alcohol-based surface cleaners. The XYZ
Distillery should now update its 3Cs approach, and look towards a future possible production scenario.
It should now ensure it retains a creative, flexible workforce, and should seek further innovative
internal and external capabilities—such as further multi-purposing its production lines, and possibly
adding a plastic bottle injection-molding line. They could also consider business optimisation and
failure-proofing processes.
Manufacturers like the car racing team Triple Eight, who work at the leading edge of their
technologies, could apply their inherent leading-edge talents, and even offer their services to new
industries such as Elon Musk’s SpaceX, or again remap their talents against other hype cycle inventions
in the energy conversion sector. These potential high-value, high-reach possibilities can again be
framed under a 3Cs approach.
The future-proofing of the Australian firm, DUK, has strategic internal business sustainability
implications. The COVID-19-induced global economic crisis has seen many astute Australian firms
re-assess their competencies. This study believes such astute firms can enlist DUK’s 3Cs approach,
and test exploratory business shifts and pivots with knowledge against differing business situations.
This change in an environment’s approach can enhance the agility, flexibility, dynamism of firm
management—leaving the firm better prepared to introduce rapid responses when required. Further,
in tough economic times, and when seeking business sustainability, Australian firms can also look
externally and be prepared to adapt against any changed external market conditions.
4.3. The External Solution
External business sustainability is another future-proofing component of the Australian firm.
Externally, a solid starting point remains Porter’s (2008) five (external) forces [54]. These forces, once
understood, then shape a business’ internal strategy against the power of its suppliers, the threat of
new market entrants, the bargaining power of its consumers/buyers, and the threat of new substitute
products and/or services.
Porter’s competitive strategy [54] approach assesses a firm, and offers long-term, planned,
directional pathways, that, over time, allow it to find a degree of competitive advantage over
its immediate, industry-wide, and global business rivals. This process is, in effect, a normal
defensive business positional strategy. It should also be directed towards acquiring an enhanced
return on investments. Thus, externalities are another strategic competitive business component
to the future-proofing of an Australian firm. An additional external advantage arises when the
firm has the ability to pivot with knowledge and to direct this reposition towards enhancing its
ongoing competitiveness.
Hamilton [55] suggests this defensive and strategic external advantages approach also extends
internally. Here, digital service-sector pathways can feed into the firm’s digital competitiveness,
and can also expose personalised business-to-individual-consumer (B2C) engagement pathways.
This again leads management to pursue new digital and actioning skills. Porter [56] adds that the
digital domain remains highly price-competitive and quickly brings rival firm challenges. Thus,
digital domains are especially difficult to future-proof. Digital marketing companies like DUK should
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remain nimble, dynamic business developers/operators. They should also remain external, global
highly-competitive performers.
4.4. The Resultant Agile ‘Pivot with Knowledge’ Solution
Figures 1 and 2 and Porter’s Five Forces model provide a base framework for the future-proofing
of an agile Australian firm. Today, an agile Australian firm, capable of generating potential pivots,
needs to maintain, and continually intermix, its networks of strategic leadership/management and
operational systems. These firms typically show dynamic but flexible equilibrium. They are often
capable of making changes on-demand as circumstances alter. In unforeseen economic crisis situations
like COVID-19, these agile Australian firms can knowledgeably operate their strategic business changes
against, and within, their advancing:
• global and local competitiveness systems
• digital business knowledge systems
• innovation and technologies systems
• capabilities systems
• optimisations and feedback systems
• economic systems
• intelligences and services systems
• internal/external leadership and overviews systems.
Hence a strategic systems structure is proposed where all constituent elements are activated and
continually enhanced. These systems can all be portrayed within the three-dimensional strategic
change matrix as shown in.
Figure 3 depicts the author’s and DUK’s strategic change matrix. DUK is a strategic marketing
company operating at its chosen matrix position 2. It has developed, and continues to develop, a
vast array of innovative, knowledge-creating competitive business tools. As it sources the new latest
ideas, DUK assesses them, and feeds the relevant ones into its modified suite of 3Cs. This flows into
DUK’s next, strategic repositioning—beyond its current strategic change matrix position 2. Thus, when
dealing with clients, DUK continually modifies, improves, and grows its learning curve position.
When assisting a SME client firm who, for example, currently operates at matrix position 1,
DUK can share some of its competencies to help deliver client firm capabilities changes. Consider
for example, an SME client firm at position 1. It has a current strategic competitive advantage, and is
operating in a secure supplier-buyer environment with minimal external competitor substitute products.
This SME client firm has its business capacities well-integrated. It possesses strong intellectual capital.
Its operations systems are producing profitable consumer-demanded items. In short, this SME client
firm is currently well-positioned within its matrix of strategic possibilities.
However, within the strategic change matrix, DUK can assist with a multiple array of internal
interlinked matrices of competencies and capabilities deliverables—ones that are likely client firm
operational enablers. DUK can then strategically lead this SME client firm into changing from its
existing matrix position 1 to, say ‘position 1a.’ It can assist with the installation pathways, the matrix
building and the innovation processes that can likely facilitate an internal and external business
repositioning into a new, expanded matrix positioning—one likely offering improved products, greater
sales, more revenue, better servicing, and additional collective intelligences. This strategic change
matrix approach is one that continually expands—whilst also becoming more efficient, effective
and integrated.
DUK used its Figure 3 approach when self-pivoting with knowledge into its chosen, expanded,
externally-advantageous matrix position. It used its competencies, especially its digital assets, and its
agile capabilities as starting points. It add pivots to its previous strategic change matrix and so created
a new dimension to its business strategy. Further internal information related to the mechanics of
Figure 3 currently remains the confidential property of DUK and its academic business researcher.
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Thus, Figure 3 embeds DUK 3Cs (its competences, its capabilities and deliverables, and its
competitiveness). It offers firms new understanding concerning their ability to matrix-box position and
further future-proof their business network. It can also aid an astute firm when seeking to strategically
change its current matrix-box position into a more expansive, more competitive matrix-box position.
Any firm can use this 3Cs and strategic change matrix approach to strategically position themselves;
they can also do this for their competitors, and so visually reinforce their points of competitive difference
against their external environment. They can also make choices as to where they may wish to reposition.
Their next matrix-box need not be a square or rectangular, and it may expand towards just one point or
towards multiple combinations of points.
The study’s COVID-19 business cases of DUK, the XYZ Distillery, Triple Eight, and BuildaDesk
indicate that as different firms, in differing industries, each firm can pivot and change the mix of their
competencies, capabilities and competitiveness (3Cs). In addition, each firm can also strategically
re-map itself into targeting another unique, and different strategic change matrix-box position—one that
likely offers a sustainable competitive business position. XYZ Distillery possessed the infrastructure
and most of the process knowledge for sanitiser manufacture, but lacked the knowledge creation, risk
capabilities, and marketing, so it joint ventured with DUK. Triple Eight and BuildaDesk each created
entirely new extension businesses, and so recreated, extended and repositioned their existing strategic
change matrix-box.
Further, firms responding to any global business crisis can use their combined 3Cs and strategic
change matrix approach. Firm ‘A’ can strategically choose to establish a new, expanded, competitive,
matrix-box position. Firm ‘B’ can strategically use a targeted diversification strategy to target a different
matrix-box repositioning. Firm ‘C’ can strategically choose to hold its current matrix-box position by
strengthening its current business deliverables.
Thus, the 3Cs and strategic change matrix approach visualises multiple strength, or expansion,
or diversification, matrix-box position options. Each option can be strategically assessed by the firm.
Then, one chosen, unique business solution to the one global business crisis can be decisively pursued.
5. Conclusions
Across the global COVID-19 pandemic in Australia, the digital marketing firm DUK, used its
3Cs model, and its strategic change matrix to re-adjust its business when its traditional client markets
changed, and to re-map its emergence into a sustainable competitive business position.
DUK recognised its consumer market had changed due to COVID-19. It pivoted with knowledge,
and it morphed into an ‘optimised’ digital marketing firm, plus new digital warehouse shopping centre
firms, as well as new logistical, marketing/deliveries health product firms. These in-house developments
initiated: new software, new data usage, new logistical mapping, new digital wallet sales/security, new
dashboard management, new workforce skilling, and new brand imaging. Other business including
the XYZ Distillery, Triple Eight and BuildaDesk have executed similar changes due to COVID-19.
The COVID-19 crisis has changed the Australian business landscape— creating new, more complex,
pivot-capable, and more competitive business models.
This study concludes DUK’s 3Cs (competencies, capabilities and competitiveness) do offer an
internal framework capable of advancing a firm towards retaining its business sustainability. It further
concludes that the strategic change matrix sets the global framework to understand a firm. This strategic
change matrix first aligns the firm’s existing competencies, capabilities and competitiveness components
into a matrix-box. Second, it offers a comparison by establishing a second, strategically desirable,
competitively expanded matrix-box (that now consumes the firm’s earlier matrix-box) with additional
revised, strategically remapped pathways, and/or further business-enhancing components.
In DUK’s case, it combined its competencies, especially its digital assets, along with its agile
capabilities. It add pivots to its firm competitiveness, and so expanded one dimension of its previous
strategic change matrix. This created an additional set of new competitiveness dimensions to its
business strategy. DUK’s increased business diversity also produced a sustainable business positioning
Sustainability 2020, 12, 6026 15 of 19
that re-set its business direction into the immediate future. It now strategically assesses pivots when
considering further strategic business changes.
Hence, the DUK 3Cs, Porter’s Five Forces, and DUK’s Pivot with Knowledge initiatives, coalesced
into its strategic change matrix, has allowed DUK to: (1) map, and deliver, a defensive and supporting
solutions-set for its existing marketing clients, and to also (2) map its own strategic change advancements
into extending its market reach, growing/diversifying its market share, achieving a sustainable business
presence, and growing its competitive advantage.
The DUK strategic change matrix-box solutions pathway is likely of particular relevance when
a firm is confronted with a future economic or game-changing business crisis, or when a firm such
as this study’s COVID-19 business cases of DUK, the XYZ Distillery, Triple Eight, and BuildaDesk,
strategically chooses to pivot with knowledge, and to pursue an alternate business-enhancing pathway,
or when a firm is investigating the future-proofing of its current business operations.
In times of crisis such as the economic decline created during the COVID-19 global pandemic,
key futures-focused management consulting firms, like Gartner [43], also suggest “expanded data
collection”, “emergence of new top-tier employers” and “increases in firm business complexity”
are three current firm deliverables areas that can add to future firm competitiveness solutions.
These management consulting firm views align with DUK and its strategic change matrix approach.
This study concludes astute Australian firms are likely to be agile and flexible with in-depth
internal and external analysis abilities. Across different industries, such firms likely understand their
competencies and capabilities. It is also likely that they can evaluate their potential pivots and business
modifications, and then target, enhancing their competitiveness.
This approach is particularly successful when such astute firms retain the strategic desire to
research, formulate, innovate, implement, and make work, their chosen new firm approaches. Today,
Australian firms seeking to improve their competitiveness can:
• First, look externally, and pursue an in-depth understanding of their surrounding local and global
competitive firm environment, their relevant industry, and their firm’s active competitors.
• Second, look technically at virtual emergent technologies, thereby allowing a thorough
understanding of potential emergent digital applications, and possible business shifts.
These should then reframe their firm’s specific choices across its business-wide, smart
connectivities workplace.
• Third, look physically, and assess their internal deliverables as potential ‘fixes’ against the firm’s
suites of operational capabilities fixes.
• Fourth, brainstorm and investigate all conceived pivots, and also readdress the previous steps
against each pivot.
• Fifth, in conjunction with the above rapid-fire processes, each firm should strategically position
their business within the above strategic change matrix shown in Figure 3. They can then
decision-target an optimal new future matrix-box position.
• Sixth, to retain a strategic business sustainability position into the immediate future, each
firm should consider reframing its 3Cs approach by refining their competencies and mixes of
deliverables within the Figure 3 strategic change matrix. Next, they use their refined 3Cs to
remodel the firm with these component additions as deliverance pathways towards their targeted
‘optimal’ matrix-box solution for tomorrow.
These six steps likely have application whenever a firm is confronted with a future economic or
game-changing business crisis, or when an astute firm strategically chooses to pivot with knowledge, and
then chooses a new business-enhancing pathway. They also hold relevance when a firm just wants to
map its business pathways into the future.
This study’s new 3D strategic change matrix approach helps to visually map the components of a
firm’s competitiveness. Although developed by DUK, and its academic researcher, it can be utilised
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by most substantive firms—particularly when mapping a strategic business expansion, business
consolidation, business retraction, or business pivoting change.
The theoretical contribution to this study lies in the build of the 3Cs framework (Figures 1 and 2).
Embedded across this framework are DUK’s component constructs and their specific measurement
indicators (which remain its confidential property). Another contribution is the dynamic nature of the
strategic change matrix. DUK added a ‘pivot’ component to the firm’s competitiveness axis of Figure 3.
This important Figure 3 addition can now be considered by a firm —particularly in times of crisis such
as when it may need to deliver an agile shift that incorporates a new or enhanced competitive business
direction. Further, into the future, new knowledge such as that embedded in Microsoft’s developing of
its ‘Democratising AI’ components can likely add to the competencies and capabilities axes. Again, the
dynamic nature of the strategic change matrix and its application is exemplified.
Hence, the strategic change matrix in Figure 3 is dynamic in nature, and expandable in terms of
components coverage. It is likely of real use to real firms when strategically assessing what makes their
firm competitive. It is also useful when finding a future change matrix-box position or when assessing
a competitor’s matrix-box for differences, or even when assessing a competitive market. Thus, the
strategic change matrix is likely to have wide firm and business applications.
6. Limitations and Future Research
This study captures the business crisis in Australia during the COVID-19 global pandemic time
period. It adapts DUK’s ongoing strategic marketing approaches. The study explains how during
COVID-19, the digital marketing firm DUK, used its own strategic change matrix, designed for its
clients, and deployed it as a means to reposition itself for the immediate future into a new sustainable
competitive business position.
This mixed methods approach cannot release the actual quantitative constructs and measures
due to DUK’s IP and confidentiality restrictions. Nevertheless, it does give the block levels, shown in
Figure 2, from which researchers can investigate their own construct measures, and then test them
over time against the strategic change matrix.
The study shows that pivoting is a useful business strategic inclusion that should be considered
when a firm faces a strategic change of position decision. Although the strategic positioning matrix
likely has applications across many agile and digital business environments, and across different
industries, it likely of most use when applied to firms of a substantive size.
The strategic positioning matrix is a dynamic, expandable structure. New inventions and
components that can contribute to a firm’s sustainability, can be logically position-added into the
strategic positioning matrix. Thus, researchers are encouraged to extend a firm’s competences and
capabilities, and competitiveness (3Cs) by further developing its internal components into additional
measurable constructs with measurement indicators.
This area of business research is ongoing, and digitally, it is moving in line with Microsoft’s
Democratising of AI inclusions, where technologies and intelligences help fuse humans and machines
together - delivering smarter accessible knowledge to all. This digital driving force is a necessary area
for firms seeking to remain competitive, and to advance their strategic change matrix- box position.
This extends to the need to incorporate stakeholders’ requirements, and to help support the firm’s
business sustainability. Into the future, this logically extends to changing how lives are influenced, how
digital apps can further extend the delivery of cognitive capabilities, and how cloud supercomputing
competencies and capabilities can integrate as enhancing components into each firm’s strategic change
matrix business solutions.
In addition, emerging management, marketing, psychological, digital, industry, and firm
discoveries (or applications) can be assessed for positional inclusion into a strategic change matrix
approach. Researchers can also initiate further new business 3Cs and/or ongoing sustainability studies.
Such component findings can also be strategically considered, mapped and possibly dynamically
included as improvements towards extending this study’s strategic change matrix.
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